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the main “evidentiary basis” for my remarks, which has been made available to conference Partici-Pants, includes an academic study of decisions of the 
committee against torture under relevant provisions of the 
UN Convention,1 as well as excerpts from the other relevant 
jurisprudence and treaties to which I will be referring.
The topics I will address are: first, where does the obligation 
to make torture a specific offense in domestic law come from? 
Second, what is the scope of jurisdiction that has to be estab-
lished for that offense in domestic law? Third, a description of 
ancillary obligations designed to ensure that torture is criminal-
ized in practice, including mandatory investigation and arrest, as 
well as prosecution and extradition. 
In terms of the obligation itself, and the sources of the obli-
gation, the first and perhaps oldest source is the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions. As you probably know, each of the Geneva 
Conventions includes provisions on “grave breaches.”2 Among 
other things, “torture” and “inhuman treatment” of prisoners, 
and “unlawful confinement” of civilians, are covered by those 
grave breaches provisions. The Conventions require that alleged 
perpetrators of “grave breaches” be searched for by the state, 
and then (in a manner that, as we will see, is similar to that even-
tually enacted for “torture” under the UN Convention against 
Torture) requires that they are either prosecuted or extradited. 
On the plus side, the Geneva Conventions have essentially 
been ratified by every country in the world. So in that sense, they 
are a good source. On the other hand, on their face, the grave 
breaches provisions only apply to international armed conflicts. 
Now, as regards non-international armed conflicts – whether as 
interpreted under U.S. Supreme Court decisions in this country 
or otherwise – there are other arguments for criminalization of 
 torture under international humanitarian law in those contexts.3 
But the other major limitation is that on its face, again, those 
grave breaches provisions apply only to the “protected per-
sons” under each Convention, and you have to look under the 
Convention for the definition.4 So, as a source of obligation, 
the Geneva Conventions do not apply all the time, everywhere, 
and they do not necessarily apply to everyone. 
The relevant part of Article 7 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights simply states: “No one shall be sub-
jected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.” The Human Rights Committee established under 
the treaty has, however, interpreted that provision as incorporat-
ing a requirement to bring perpetrators to justice.5 In fact, in 
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a particular case, Rajapaksa v. Sri Lanka, in 2006 it actually 
found Sri Lanka to be in violation, apparently for having failed 
its duty to prosecute and punish the perpetrator of torture under 
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.6 But again, there’s 
nothing actually written into the text of the Covenant itself about 
criminalization or prosecution, so some states might say “thank 
you esteemed experts but we respectfully disagree with you,” 
leaving matters at a sort of impasse.
Customary international law is another possible source, 
although most people think that in terms of the obligation to 
criminalize and punish and so on, customary international law 
is permissive rather than mandatory. But the case of Hissène 
Habré, the former President of Chad, who is accused of crimes 
against humanity – including torture – in Chad, is of interest. He 
is currently under house arrest in Senegal, and Belgium has been 
seeking to have him extradited or prosecuted for some time. 
Belgium has now filed an application to the International Court 
of Justice, against Senegal, relying in part on customary interna-
tional law, arguing that it actually poses mandatory obligations 
to either prosecute or extradite;7 however, they also rely on the 
explicit provisions of the Convention against Torture, which 
will in fact form the basis for the rest of my remarks.
The UN Convention against Torture is the most explicit and 
detailed international code or source for the obligation to crimi-
nalize torture.8 It expressly addresses both war and peace time.9 
It has some 146 state parties. The Convention itself does not 
specifically say that there must be a distinct offense or definition 
named “torture” in domestic law, but certainly the Committee 
has consistently, in dozens and dozens of instances, stated that 
it interprets the Convention as requiring that there must indeed 
be a separate definition, a separate offense, of torture in national 
law.10 So it is not sufficient that any act of torture might be 
covered by a general offense of “assault” under national law, as 
many countries argue. There is very good reason to accept the 
Committee’s interpretation of the Convention. First of all, as I 
will discuss in a moment, the Convention specifically requires 
each state to eliminate certain defenses in respect of any act of 
torture, defenses that might otherwise ordinarily apply to all 
offenses in the state’s criminal code; how could a state make 
such defenses inapplicable to every act of torture if “torture” is 
not defined in national law? Second, the Convention requires that 
an appropriate sentencing range be available in respect of acts of 
torture;11 again, how is a state to ensure an appropriate sentenc-
ing range for all acts of torture if “torture” is not mentioned in 
its criminal code? Third, as we will see, the Convention requires 
states to establish international, potentially global, jurisdiction 
over acts of torture, and very few if any countries have interna-* Matt Pollard is Legal Advisor at Amnesty International in London.
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tional, global jurisdiction over simple assault offenses, so again 
how is a state going clearly to establish that jurisdiction without 
a definition of “torture” under its laws.
The Committee does not necessarily expect states to enact 
exactly the definition that appears in Article 1 of the Convention 
verbatim into domestic laws, but any national law definition 
must cover at minimum all acts covered by the Convention 
 definition.12 The elements of any such definition were men-
tioned by Professor Nowak; key among them are severe pain 
and suffering whether physical or mental, inflicted for cer-
tain purposes set out in the Convention. The definition in the 
Convention excludes “pain or suffering arising only from, 
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions,” but “lawful” 
in this context is generally interpreted to mean lawful under 
international law.13 So a state cannot say “well, that particular 
type of treatment or punishment is actually provided for in our 
national laws, and therefore excluded from the definition of the 
Convention, and therefore not a problem.” To allow otherwise 
would obviously completely undermine the purpose and objec-
tive of the treaty, for one thing. Further, if one refers to the UN 
General Assembly’s 1975 Declaration on Torture, it contained 
a similar exclusion, but one which more precisely referred to 
“lawful sanctions to the extent consistent with the Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.”14 This is prob-
ably the best way to understand, what the Convention meant to 
exclude by referring to “lawful sanctions,” that there may be, for 
instance, severe mental pain and suffering inherent in the simple 
fact of being incarcerated, but if the incarceration is fully in 
compliance with human rights standards then such punishment 
is excluded from the definition.15 
Article 4(1) of the Convention specifically requires not only 
that each state criminalize every “act of torture” in the sense 
of the person who actually inflicts the pain and suffering, but 
also that any “attempt to commit torture” and any act “by any 
person which constitutes complicity or participation in torture” 
be included. The concepts of “complicity” and “participation” 
often already exist in national laws, though they may be called 
“aiding or abetting” or “accessory” or other terms. Once again, 
however, whatever its name, the concept of “attempt,” “com-
plicity” and “participation” applied at the national level must 
cover at least everything that is meant by the treaty itself when it 
uses those words. By way of illustration, several cases from the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia help 
to give a sense of the breadth of such concepts (therein discussed 
in terms of “co-perpetration” and “aiding and abetting”) under 
international law.16
In terms of the absoluteness of the prohibition of torture, 
including at the national level, Article 2(2) of the Convention 
provides that “[n]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever .  .  . 
may be invoked as a justification of torture” and expressly 
including “a state of war or a threat of war, internal political 
instability or any other public emergency.” Many national crimi-
nal codes will have general defenses of necessity, or defense 
of self, defense of others, and so on, which might ordinarily 
apply in respect of other crimes in situations of duress. Clearly 
any such defenses must somehow be made inapplicable in 
national law to the offense of torture in order to comply with the 
Convention, and indeed to comply with the absoluteness of the 
prohibition that applies more generally under customary interna-
tional law. Article 2(3) of the Convention also specifically says 
that “[a]n order from a superior officer or a public authority may 
not be invoked as a justification of torture.” Such defenses are 
often set out more generally under national laws, for instance to 
allow legitimate (proportionate and necessary) use of force by 
law enforcement officials which otherwise might constitute an 
assault. Any such defenses must again somehow be made inap-
plicable to torture in national law.
Article 5 of the Convention requires that states establish in 
national law several bases of jurisdiction over acts of torture [as 
well as attempt, complicity and participation]. First, territorial 
jurisdiction: all acts of torture carried out on the State’s terri-
tory must be covered by national criminal law. The article also 
requires that extraterritorial jurisdiction be established on several 
possible grounds. Thus, all acts of torture, carried out anywhere, 
must be covered by a state’s criminal law if the perpetrator is 
a national of the state; so, in the case of an American offender 
accused in respect of acts committed in another country, indeed 
even an American astronaut on the moon who tortures another 
astronaut, U.S. criminal law must be made to apply to that act. 
Finally, if an alleged offender of whatever nationality comes into 
a state’s territory, and is not extradited to another state, the state 
must be able to exercise criminal jurisdiction over acts of torture 
of which he or she is accused, regardless of where the alleged 
acts took place or against whom they were perpetrated.17 
It is not enough that states enable such jurisdiction in 
national law; the Convention requires specific actions that 
must take place when particular instances arise. For instance, if 
someone is on the state’s territory who is accused of an act of 
torture, under Article 6 the state is required to take the individual 
into custody or otherwise to ensure his or her presence pending 
investigation. (Interestingly, in the International Court of Justice 
application mentioned earlier, Belgium is asking the Court to 
order provisional measures, similar to an interim injunction, 
that Senegal is bound to ensure that Habré is kept under house 
arrest or otherwise unable to escape from the country.) Having 
taken the person into custody, the state is then required to begin 
inquiring into the facts, and to notify and report promptly the 
results to the state or states whose territories or nationals may 
be involved. Again, these obligations apply not only vis-à-vis a 
person accused of actually inflicting the pain and suffering, but 
also to anyone who was involved through complicity or partici-
pation. At the heart of this scheme, which is aimed at ensuring 
that there is “no safe haven” anywhere in the world for torturers, 
is an express obligation in Article 7 to prosecute or extradite the 
alleged offender. It is a strictly either/or proposition with only 
two possibilities: either the case is submitted for prosecution by 
the state’s own authorities, or (assuming another state is seeking 
extradition) the person is extradited for prosecution elsewhere. 
(In its application to the International Court of Justice, Belgium is 
relying expressly on Articles 5 and 7 in its case against Senegal, 
arguing Senegal is obliged under the Convention against 
Torture to either prosecute this person or send him to Belgium 
for prosecution and, as Senegal has done neither, Belgium
argues it has violated its obligations under the Convention.) 
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Note that the Convention does not on its face state that every 
case must ultimately be brought to trial and the person con-
victed; Article 7 requires that the state “submit the case to its 
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution,” and that 
those authorities “shall take their decision in the same manner as 
in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the 
law of that State.” In other words, in deciding whether to take 
forward the case for prosecution, the authorities cannot apply 
a lower standard, or a higher standard, of evidence, and they 
should not allow political or other improper criteria to influence 
their decision. The Convention does not dispense with the need 
for a proper criminal case;18 admissible evidence is required, 
one shouldn’t expect that simply providing newspaper reports, 
or say a book, to the authorities will trigger an obligation to 
prosecute.19
All of this applies to every one of the 146 countries who is a 
party to the Convention. As the conference is taking place in the 
United States, however, I will make a few specific observations. 
Obviously the Executive Orders issued by President Obama are 
very positive and encouraging on a going-forward basis, but 
problems remain that have to be addressed, some of which are 
probably obvious to you at this point in my presentation. 
First, at the time that the United States ratified the Conven-
tion, the Senate stated certain “understandings” about how it 
interprets the definition in Article 1 of the Convention, includ-
ing the words “severe mental pain and suffering.”20 And those 
understandings have found their way into the definition of 
torture under U.S. criminal law.21 It would seem that has not 
changed with the Executive Order, as we are talking about 
Congressional legislation. 
Second, a statutory defense was slipped into the 2005 
Detainee Treatment Act, on “Protection of United States Gov-
ern ment Personnel Engaged in Authorized Interrogations” 
[section 1004]. It applies to U.S. personnel who face civil or 
criminal proceedings arising out of their involvement in “spe-
cific operational practices” that involved “detention and inter-
rogation of aliens” who the executive believed were “engaged 
in or associated with international terrorist activity.” It seems to 
be a type of “ignorance of the law” or “due diligence” defense, 
making it a defense for any accused who establishes that he or 
she “did not know that the practices were unlawful and a person 
of ordinary sense and understanding would not know the prac-
tices were unlawful,” and that “[g]ood faith reliance on advice of 
counsel should be an important factor, among others, to consider 
in assessing whether a person of ordinary sense and understand-
ing would have known the practices to be unlawful.” Under the 
Convention, there is little if any room for any defense of due 
diligence or ignorance of the law when it comes to torture. This 
may be especially so given that, so far as I understand, the rea-
son that Congress felt it needed to enact the specific provision is 
because similar defenses do not exist under U.S. law in respect 
of other similarly serious criminal offenses. 
Finally we had the admissions before Congress by state 
officials during the previous administration that indeed some 
individuals were subjected to water-boarding (at the same time 
denying that it constituted torture under U.S. law).22 We also 
have the admission of the Convening Authority at Guantánamo 
Detention Center that one of the Military Commission cases 
was stopped because she concluded that the person had been 
tortured.23 As I have explained, under the Convention once you 
have – as in these cases – public acknowledgements of acts of 
torture, certain machinery of criminal investigation and pros-
ecution is certainly supposed to start operating. Now, perhaps 
it is operating behind closed doors and we are not aware of it, 
but weeks have gone by without further comment. We must 
add this, then, to the list of questions that must continue to be 
asked about the consistency of U.S. law and practice with its 
international obligations regarding “torture as a specific criminal 
offence in domestic laws.” Thank you.   HRB
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